Abstract. In most password-authenticated key exchange systems there is a single server storing password verification data. To provide some resilience against server compromise, this data typically takes the form of a one-way function of the password (and possibly a salt, or other public values) rather than the password itself. However, if the server is compromised, this password verification data can be used to perform an off-line dictionary attack on the user's password. In this paper we propose an efficient password-authenticated key exchange system involving a set of servers with known public keys, in which a certain threshold of servers must participate in the authentication of a user, and in which the compromise of any fewer than that threshold of servers does not allow an attacker to perform an off-line dictionary attack. We prove our system is secure in the random oracle model under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption against an attacker that may eavesdrop on, insert, delete, or modify messages between the user and servers, and that compromises fewer than that threshold of servers.
Introduction
Many real-world systems today rely on password authentication to verify the identity of a user before allowing that user to perform certain functions, such as setting up a virtual private network or downloading secret information. There are many security concerns associated with password authentication, due mainly to the fact that most users' passwords are drawn from a relatively small and easily generated dictionary. Thus if information sufficient to verify a password guess is leaked, the password may be found by performing an off-line dictionary attack: one can run through a dictionary of possible passwords, testing each one against the leaked information in order to determine the correct password.
When password authentication is performed over a network, one must be especially careful not to allow any leakage of information to one listening in, or even actively attacking, the network. If one assumes the server's public key is known (or at least can be verified) by the user, then performing password authentication after setting up an anonymous secure channel to the server is generally sufficient to prevent leakage of information, as is done in SSH [37] or on the web using SSL [16] . Halevi and Krawczyk [28] give the first protocol of this type that is proven secure. The problem becomes more difficult if the server's public key cannot be verified by the user. Solutions to this problem have been coined strong password authentication protocols, and have the property that (informally) the probability of an active attacker (i.e., one that may eavesdrop on, insert, delete, or modify messages on a network) impersonating a user is only negligibly better than a simple online guessing attack, consisting of the attacker iteratively guessing passwords and running the authentication protocol. Strong password authentication protocols were proposed by Bellovin and Merritt [5] , [6] , Jablon [31] , and Wu [38] , among others. Recently, some protocols were proven secure in the random oracle and/or ideal cipher models 1 [1] , [10] , and [34] , in the public random string model [33] , and in the standard model 2 [26] . However, all of these protocols, even the ones in which the server's public key is known to the user, are vulnerable to server compromise in the sense that compromising the server would allow an attacker to obtain the password verification data on that server (typically some type of one-way function of the password and some public values). This could then be used to perform an off-line dictionary attack on the password. To address this issue (without resorting to assumptions like tamper resistance), Ford and Kaliski [22] proposed to distribute the functionality of the server, forcing an attacker to compromise several servers in order to be able to obtain password verification data. 3 Their protocol assumes the servers have known public keys. Note that the main problem is not just to distribute the password verification data, but to distribute the functionality, i.e., to distribute the password verification data such that it can be used for authentication without ever reconstructing the data on any set of servers smaller than a chosen threshold. While distributed cryptosystems have been studied extensively (and many proven secure) for other cryptographic operations, such as signatures (e.g., [9] , [15] , [24] , and [23] ), to our knowledge Ford and Kaliski were the first ones to propose a distributed password-authenticated key exchange system. However, they give no proof of security for their system. Jablon [32] extends the system of Ford and Kaliski, most notably to not require the server's public key to be known to the user, but again does not give a proof of security.
Our contributions. In this paper we propose a completely different distributed password-authenticated key exchange system and prove it secure in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [17] (see [8] ). Like the system of Ford and Kaliski, we assume the servers have known public keys. However, while the systems of Ford and Kaliski and Jablon require all servers to perform authentication, our system is a k-out-of-n threshold system (for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n), where k servers are required for authentication and the compromise of k − 1 servers does not affect the security of the system. Also, this is the first distributed password-authenticated key exchange system proven secure under any standard cryptographic assumption in any model, including the random oracle model. To be specific, we assume the client may store public data, and our security is against an active attacker that may (statically) compromise any number of servers less than the specified threshold.
Informally, one can succinctly state our main result as a distributed password-authenticated key exchange protocol for which any efficient attacker can do no better than an online dictionary attack as long as the DDH problem is hard, and as long as no more than a threshold k − 1 out of n servers are compromised.
Technically, we achieve our result by storing a semantically secure encryption of a function of the password at the servers (instead of simply storing a one-way function of the password), and then leveraging off some known solutions for distributing secret decryption keys, such as Feldman verifiable secret sharing [20] . In other words, we transform the problem of distributing password-authentication information to the problem of distributing cryptographic keys. However, once we make this transformation, verifying passwords without leaking information becomes much more difficult, requiring intricate manipulations of ElGamal encryptions [19] and careful use of efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [7] . In particular, we note that one cannot immediately obtain a solution through standard threshold cryptography techniques, since those techniques are not designed to prevent leakage of information when secrets may be chosen from a small set (e.g., when the secrets are passwords).
We note that a threshold password-authentication system does not follow from techniques for general secure multi-party computation (e.g., [27] ) since we are working in an asynchronous model, allow concurrent executions of protocols, and assume no authenticated channels. (Note in particular that the goal of the protocol is for the client to be authenticated.) The only work on general secure multi-party computation in an asynchronous model, and allowing concurrency, assumes authenticated channels [12] .
Related work. Subsequent to our work, Di Raimondo and Gennaro [18] presented a distributed password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on the protocol of [33] . Here we highlight the differences from our protocol. Their protocol does not assume the servers have known public keys, whereas ours assumes the servers have known public keys. Their protocol is in the public random string model, whereas ours is proven secure in the random oracle model. Their protocol requires a threshold k where 3k < n, and requires all n servers to be active. Ours allows any threshold k < n, and allows only k servers to be active when no malicious behavior occurs.
Model
We extend the model of [1] (which builds on [3] and [4] , and is also used in [33] ). The model of [1] was designed for the problem of authenticated key exchange (ake) between two parties, a client and a server. The goal was for them to engage in a protocol such that after the protocol was completed, they would each hold a session key that is known to nobody but the two of them. Our model is designed for the problem of distributed authenticated key exchange (dake) between a client and k servers. The goal is for them to engage in a protocol such that after the protocol is completed, the client would hold k session keys, one being shared with each server, such that the session key shared between the client and a given server is known to nobody but the two of them, even if up to k − 1 other servers were to conspire together.
Note that this definition is in some sense optimized for the case when the servers do not misbehave. The client simply contacts any k servers and runs the protocol. If fewer than k servers do not perform the protocol honestly, then at least one uncompromised server will notice this, and the protocol will fail. This problem may be resolved in many ways, the simplest being the client iteratively trying different sets of k servers. Eventually, of course, the system must determine the compromised servers and reset the system, possibly using techniques from proactive security [30] , [29] . These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. Here we focus on the basic protocol.
Remark 2.1. The way we have defined dake, the client ends up with k shared keys, while the goal of a standard authenticated key exchange is for the client to end up with a single key shared with a server it wishes to communicate with. There are alternative definitions that would more closely mimic this. However, we feel our definition is more general, since once the client can securely communicate with k servers, it can use this not only to enable secure communication with any other desired server, but to enable any desired cryptographic functionality. For instance, a secure dake protocol allows for secure downloadable credentials, by, e.g., having the servers store an encrypted credentials file with a decryption key stored using a threshold scheme among them, and then having each send a partial decryption of the credentials file to the client, encrypted with the session key it shares with the client. (To deal with compromised servers, one could require each server to also send a zero-knowledge proof that it performed its partial decryption correctly.) Note that the credentials are secure in a threshold sense: fewer than the given threshold of servers are unable to obtain the credentials. Once the client has securely downloaded its credentials (for instance, it could download its certified public key and the associated private key), it can use these credentials to set up secure communication with another server, or perhaps sign messages, or perform other cryptographic operations. Details of these applications are beyond the scope of this paper.
In the following we assume some familiarity with the model of [1] .
Protocol participants. We have two types of protocol participants: clients and servers. Let ID def = Clients ∪ Servers be a non-empty set of protocol participants, or principals. We assume Servers consists of n servers, denoted {S 1 , . . . , S n }, and that these servers are meant to cooperate in authenticating a client. 4 Each client C ∈ Clients has a secret password π C , and each server S ∈ Servers has a vector
is the password record. Let Password C be a (possibly small) set from which passwords for client C are selected. We assume that π C R ← Password C (but our results easily extend to other password distributions). Clients and servers are modeled as probabilistic poly-time algorithms with an input tape and an output tape.
Execution of the protocol. A protocol P is an algorithm that determines how principals behave in response to inputs from their environment. In the real world each principal is able to execute P multiple times with different partners, and we model this by allowing an unlimited number of instances of each principal. Instance i of principal U ∈ ID is denoted U i . To describe the security of the protocol, we assume there is an adversary A that has complete control over the environment (mainly, the network), and thus provides the inputs to instances of principals. (Note in particular that we do not assume the communication between any parties is authenticated or private, even between servers.) We further assume the network (i.e., A) performs aggregation and broadcast functions. 5 In practice, on a point-to-point network, the protocol implementor would most likely have to implement these functionalities in some way, perhaps using a single intermediate (untrusted) node to aggregate and broadcast messages. 6 Formally, the adversary is a probabilistic algorithm with a distinguished query tape. Queries written to this tape are responded to by principals according to P; the allowed queries are formally defined in [1] and summarized here (with slight modifications for multiple servers):
The instance computes what the protocol says to, state is updated, and the output message is given to A. If this query causes U i to accept or terminate, this will also be shown to A. To initiate a session between client C and a set of servers, the adversary should send a message containing a set I of k indices of servers in Servers to an unused instance of C. is output; otherwise, a string is drawn uniformly from the space of session keys and output. As above, a Test query (of either type) may be asked at any time during the execution of P, but may only be asked once.
The Reveal queries are used to model an adversary who obtains information on session keys in some sessions, and the Test queries are a technical addition to the model that allows us to determine if an adversary can distinguish a true session key from a random key.
We assume A may compromise up to k − 1 servers, and that the choice of these servers is static. In particular, without loss of generality, we may assume the choice is made before initialization, and we may simply assume the adversary has access to the private keys of the compromised servers.
Partnering. A server instance that accepts holds a partner-id pid, session-id sid, and a session key sk. A client instance that accepts holds a partner-id pid consisting of a set of k server indices, a session-id sid, and a set of k session keys (sk j 1 , . . . , sk j k ). Let sid be the concatenation of all messages (or pre-specified compacted representations of the messages) sent and received by the client instance in its communication with the set of servers. (Note that this excludes messages that are sent only between servers, but not to the client. Also, as discussed above, we assume the network performs aggregation and broadcast functions so each server can see the messages communicated between the client and other servers, and thus can construct sid.) Then instances C i (with C ∈ Clients) holding (pid, sid, (sk j 1 , . . . , sk j k )), where pid = I for some set I = { j 1 , . . . , j k }, and S j j (with S j ∈ Servers) holding (pid , sid , sk) are said to be partnered if j ∈ I , pid = C, sid = sid , and sk j = sk. This is basically the so-called "matching conversation" approach to defining partnering, as used in [3] and [1] . that has terminated and is fresh, and eventually A outputs a bit b , where b = b for the bit b that was selected in the Test query. The dake advantage of A attacking P is defined to be
The following fact is easily verified.
Definitions
Let κ be the cryptographic security parameter. Let G q denote a finite (cyclic) group of order q, where |q| = κ. Let g be a generator of G q , and assume it is included in the description of G q . We denote by the set of all functions H from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} ∞ . This set is provided with a probability measure by saying that a random H from assigns to each x ∈ {0, 1} * a sequence of bits, each of which is selected uniformly at random. As shown in [2] , this sequence of bits may be used to define the output of H in a specific set, and thus we assume that we can specify that the output of a random oracle H be interpreted as a (random) element of G q . 7 Access to any public random oracle H ∈ is given to all algorithms; specifically, it is given to the protocol P and the adversary A. Assume that secret session keys are drawn from {0,
Notation
All functions we use in this paper include a security parameter as input, either implicitly or explicitly, and we say that these functions are negligible if they are negligible in the security parameter. (They will be polynomial in all other parameters.)
Protocol
In this section we describe our protocol for threshold password-authenticated key exchange. In the next section we prove this protocol is secure under the DDH assumption [8] , [17] in the random-oracle model [2] .
Server Setup
Let there be n servers {S i } i∈{1,2,...,n} . Let (x, y) be the servers' global key pair such that y = g x . The servers share the global secret key x using a (k, n)-threshold Feldman secret sharing protocol [20] . Specifically, a polynomial f (z) = 
(In this paper we assume that a trusted dealer generates these shares, but it should be possible to have the servers generate them using a distributed protocol, as in [25] . In addition, each server S i independently generates its own local key pair
Each server S i publishes its local public key y i along with its share of the global public key y i . Note that we assume that the adversary does not participate in the system setup phase, so all keys are generated honestly. 
Client Setup
A client C ∈ Clients has a secret password π C drawn from a set Password C . We assume Password C can be mapped into Z * q , and for the remainder of the paper we use passwords as if they were elements of Z * q . C creates an ElGamal ciphertext E C of the value g
using the servers' global public key y. More precisely, he selects α R ← Z q and computes
He sends E C to each of the servers S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, who record (C, E C ) in their database. (Alternatively, a trusted CA could be used, but again we choose to keep our model as simple as possible.) We consider E C to be public information, and in our protocol, we assume that the client knows E C . The client could simply store E C , or obtain a (certified) copy of E C through interaction with the servers. (It should be clear that storing E C at the client is not the same as storing a shared secret key.) We also assume the adversary does not observe or participate in the system and client setup phases. (Of course, the adversary could learn E C by corrupting any server. Indeed, this is why we cannot assume E C is private.)
Client Login Protocol
A high-level description of the protocol is given in Fig. 1 , and the formal description is given in Appendix A.4. Our protocol for a client C ∈ Clients relies on a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (SS-NIZKP) scheme (see Appendix A for the definition of an SS-NIZKP scheme) Q = (Prove Q , Verify Q , Sim Q ) over a language defined by a predicate Q that takes elements of {0, 1} * × (G q × G q ) 3 and is defined as
The algorithms Prove Q , Verify Q , and Sim Q use a random oracle H 3 . Prove Q may be implemented in a standard way as a three-move honest-verifier proof made noninteractive by using the hash function to generate the verifier's random challenge, and having τ be an extra input to the hash function. Other proofs defined below may be implemented similarly.
Here we discuss Fig. 1 . The client C ∈ Clients receives a set I of k servers in Servers and initiates the protocol with that set, by broadcasting I along with its own identity C. (As stated above, we assume aggregation and broadcast functionalities in the network for the communication between the client and the servers, and among the servers themselves.) In return C receives nonces from the servers in I . The client first generates a session public keyỹ. The client then "removes" the password from the ciphertext E C by raising it to π C and dividing g out of the first element of the tuple, and reblinds the result to form B. The quantity V is then formed to satisfy the predicate Client C Server S i (i ∈ I)
Q , and an SS-NIZKP σ is created to bind B, V ,ỹ, and the nonces from the servers. This SS-NIZKP also forces the client to behave properly, and in particular allows a simulator in the proof of security to operate correctly. (The idea is similar to the use of a second encryption to achieve (lunchtime) chosen-ciphertext security in [35] .) After verifying the SS-NIZKP, if the client has used the password π = π C , it will be that B [1] = y β+απ and B [2] = g β+απ . The servers then run DistVerify(τ, B, V ) to verify that log g y = log B [2] B [1] . Effectively, they are verifying (without decryption) that B is a valid encryption of the plaintext message 1. Each server S i then computes a session key K i , which has also been computed by the client.
Intuitively, an honest client in this protocol does not reveal any password information since he simply sends an encryption of 1, along with V , which is an encryption of g π C under a public key for which no one knows the secret key. However, one must consider the case of an adversary impersonating a client using π = π C , and colluding with up to k − 1 dishonest servers. Here we must rely on DistVerify(τ, B, V ) to prevent leakage of information on π C . We discuss this below.
Efficiency. For the following calculations we use the proof constructions of Appendix A. Recall that there are k servers involved in the execution of the protocol. The protocol requires six rounds, where each round is an exchange of messages among some of the participants. All messages are of length proportional to the size of a group element. The client is involved in only the first three rounds, while the servers are involved in all rounds. The client performs 15 + k exponentiations, and each server performs 14 + 38k exponentiations.
Remark 4.2. These costs are obviously much higher than the Ford-Kaliski scheme, but remember that our protocol is the first to achieve provable security (in the random oracle model). Also, the costs may be reasonable for practical implementations with k in the range of {2, . . . , 5}.
Remark 4.3.
Our protocol does not provide forward security. To achieve forward security, each server S i would need to generate its Diffie-Hellman values dynamically, instead of simply using y i . Then these values would need to be certified somehow by S i to protect the client against a man-in-the-middle attack. Details are beyond the scope of this paper.
The DistVerify Protocol
The DistVerify protocol takes three parameters, τ , B, and V , and is run by the servers {S i } i∈I to verify that log g y = log B [2] B [1] , i.e., B is an encryption of 1. The parameter V is used in order to allow a proof of security. The protocol is shown in Fig. 2 , and uses the standard notation for Lagrange coefficients:
The basic idea of the protocol is as follows. First the servers distributively compute
they use the (standard) technique which randomizes the quotient B[1]/(B[2])
x if and only if it is not equal to 1. (This is basically how we prevent leakage of password information in the case of an adversary impersonating a client discussed above.) Then they take the second component (i.e., g) and distributively
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3:
Step 4:
compute g x using their shared secrets. Finally they verify that g x = y, implying (with high probability) that B [ 
1] = (B[2])
x , and hence B is an encryption of 1. In more detail, notice that in Step 1, when a server S i computes B i (its own randomization of B), it also computes auxiliary encryptions V i , V i , and V i , which use the same randomization value and are computed using V . Similar to V , these auxiliary encryptions are used only in order to allow a proof of security. Finally in Step 1 an SS-NIZKP is computed to force the server to behave properly. (Again, the idea here is similar to the use of a second encryption to achieve (lunchtime) chosen-ciphertext security in [35] . It gives the simulator an alternate way to determine the adversary's behavior, and in particular allows the simulator to compute decryption shares for honest servers without knowing the decryption key.)
In Step 2 the pair (y, g) is computed, along with a partial computation of g x using the server's individual share of x. However, this partial computation value is not revealed yet. First the server essentially proves that he knows how to perform the partial computation (i.e., that he knows his share of x). This proof is also dependent on τ , which basically includes the important parts of the transcripts of all servers. The value τ is included so all uncompromised servers can agree on the shared values they are using to compute (y, g) before revealing their partial computations, so as to not leak any information.
In Step 3, once the server receives valid proofs from Step 2, it reveals its partial computation of g x and proves that this computation was performed correctly. In Step 4, once a server receives partial computations from all servers along with valid proofs, it tests whether y = g x .
DistVerify uses an SS-NIZKP scheme R = (Prove R , Verify R , Sim R ) over a language defined by a predicate R that takes elements of Z × (G q × G q ) 6 and is defined as
and
The algorithms Prove R , Verify R , and Sim R use a random oracle H 4 .
DistVerify also uses an SS-NIZKP scheme S = (Prove S , Verify S , Sim S ) over a language defined by a predicate S that takes elements of Z × {0,
The algorithms Prove S , Verify S , and Sim S use a random oracle H 5 . Finally, DistVerify uses an SS-NIZKP scheme T = (Prove T , Verify T , Sim T ) over a language defined by a predicate T that takes elements of Z × {0, 1}
and is defined as
The algorithms Prove T , Verify T , and Sim T use a random oracle H 6 .
Security of the Protocol
Here we state the DDH assumption. Following that we prove that the protocol P is secure, based on the DDH assumption.
Decision Diffie-Hellman. Here we formally state the DDH assumption. For full details, see [8] . Let G q be as in Section 3, with generator g. For two values X = g x and Y = g y , let DH(X, Y ) = g xy . Let A be an algorithm that on input (X, Y, Z ) outputs "1" if it believes that Z = DH(X, Y ), and "0" otherwise. For any A running in time t,
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries of time complexity at most t. The DDH assumption states that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Adv
Protocol P
Here we prove that protocol P is secure, in the sense that an adversary attacking the system that compromises fewer than k out of n servers cannot determine session keys with significantly greater advantage than that of an online dictionary attack. Recall that we consider only static compromising of servers, i.e., the adversary chooses which servers to compromise before the execution of the system. Let t exp be the time required to perform an exponentiation in G q . 
Proof. We begin with a sketch of the proof, and later provide the details.
Sketch. Our proof proceeds by introducing a series of protocols P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P 7 related to P, with P 0 = P. In P 7 , A will be reduced simply to "guessing" the correct password π C . We describe these protocols informally in Fig. 3 . For each i from 1 to 7, we prove that the difference between the advantage of A attacking protocols P i−1 and P i is negligible.
The probability of a collision of nonces is easily seen to be negligible.
P 0 The original protocol P. P 1 The nonces are assumed to be distinct (and thus Reveal queries do not reveal anything that could help in a Test query). P 2 The Diffie-Hellman key exchange between a client and an uncompromised server is replaced with a perfect key exchange (and thus an adversary that does not succeed in impersonating a client to an uncompromised server does not obtain any information that could help in a Test query). P 3 Value V from a client, and values V i , V i , V i , R i from uncompromised servers, are replaced by random values. The Q-SS-NIZKP σ , and each R-SS-NIZKP σ i , S-SS-NIZKP i , and T -SS-NIZKP i , are constructed using the associated simulators. P 4 Value B from a client is replaced with a random encryption of 1, and authentication of an honest client is changed so that uncompromised servers compute C i values without using their secret shares. Also, H 0 (y) returns a value h with a known discrete log. P 5 The adversary succeeds if it ever sends a V value associated with the correct password. P 6 Abort if the adversary creates a new and valid S-SS-NIZKP or T -SS-NIZKP associated with an uncompromised server. P 7 Value E C for each client is changed to a random value, and on any adversary login attempt for C, the B i and C i values from uncompromised servers are replaced with random values (so as to force a failure).
Fig. 3.
Informal description of protocols P 0 -P 7 .
P 1 → P 2 This can be shown using a standard reduction from DDH. On input (X, Y, Z ), we plug in random powers of Y for the servers' local public keys, and random powers of X for the clients'ỹ values, and then check H 2 queries for appropriate powers of Z . P 2 → P 3 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X, Y, Z ), we plug Y in for h = H 0 (y), and we use X and Z to create (randomized) encryptions for all V , V i , V i , V i , and R i values. Also, we must factor in the negligible probability of a simulation error in one of the SS-NIZKPs. P 3 → P 4 This is straightforward, since the view of the adversary is indistinguishable in these two protocols. P 4 → P 5 This is straightforward, since this could only increase the probability of the adversary succeeding. Below we use the fact that the discrete log of h is known, and that the C i value computed when authenticating a client's B value by an uncompromised server does not use the secret share of that server. P 5 → P 6 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X, Y, Z ), we plug Y in for y, simulate the public shares of the uncompromised servers, and let h = X . Given a correct SS-NIZKP for an uncompromised server, we can compute (h ) x , where y = g x (where x is not known). Then we simply check if Z = (h )
x . There is a difficulty now in performing authentication on B values chosen by the adversary, since we do not know the secret shares (the x i values) for the uncompromised servers. Therefore to perform authentication, we use the fact that the discrete log of h is known so we can decrypt all V , V i , V i , and V i values, and then use these decryptions to aid in computing the correct value of g x (even though we do not know x). Finally, we generate C i values from uncompromised servers in such a way that the product is g x , similar to the way the C i values are computed by uncompromised servers for authentication of a client's B value. Note that the SS-NIZKPs are already being simulated. P 6 → P 7 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X, Y, Z ), we plug Y in for y, simulate the public shares of the uncompromised servers, and use X and Z to create (randomized) encryptions for all E C values. This does not affect authentication using B values generated by clients (since these values are random encryptions of 1 at this point, anyway One can see that in P 2 , an adversary that does not succeed in impersonating a client to an uncompromised server gains negligible advantage in determining a real session key from a random session key. The remainder of the protocols are used to show that an adversary gains negligible advantage in impersonating a client over a simple online guessing attack. In particular, in P 7 the password is only used to check V values submitted by the adversary attempting to impersonate a client. The theorem follows.
Details. We use the terminology "in a CLIENT ACTION i query to C" to mean "in a Send or Execute query to C that results in the CLIENT ACTION i procedure being executed," and "in a SERVER ACTION i query to S" to mean "in a Send or Execute query to S that results in the SERVER ACTION i procedure being executed." Details of these procedures can be found in the formal specification of the protocol in Appendix A. 4 .
We assume without loss of generality that k, n, n ro , and n in +n ex are all at least 1. In the following protocols we let J be the set of indices of compromised servers. Without loss of generality, we assume |J | = k −1. For each uncompromised server S i , let J i = {i}∪ J .
Protocol P 1 . Let E be the event that two server keys y i and y j are the same, or that a server S i generates the same nonce c i in SERVERACTION1 queries in two different instances, or that one or more clients generate the sameỹ value in different CLIENTACTION2 queries. Let P 1 be a protocol that is identical to P 0 except that if E occurs, the protocol aborts (and thus the adversary fails).
Note that if E does not occur, then it will never be the case that A makes a Reveal (C, i, S j ) query where
, and there is another client or server instance that generates a key using H 2 (I, τ,ỹ j ) that is not a partner to the instance corresponding to the Reveal query.
Claim 5.2. For any adversary A,
Proof. Straightforward.
Protocol P 2 . Let E be the event that A makes an H 2 (I, τ,ỹ i ) query for a valueỹ i = DH(ỹ, y i ) for some key y i belonging to an uncompromised server S i , and for someỹ generated in a CLIENT ACTION 2 query to a client C that generated τ . Let P 2 be a protocol that is identical to P 1 except that if E occurs, the protocol aborts (and thus the adversary fails).
Claim 5.3. For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t = O(t + (n
Proof. Let ε be the probability that E occurs when A is running against protocol P 1 . Then Pr(Succ 
In a SERVER ACTION 6 query to an uncompromised server S i , ifỹ was generated in a CLIENT ACTION 2 query to a client C, replace the normal generation of K with K ← K i for the K i value generated by that CLIENT ACTION 2 query. 4. In an H 2 query, if the query is (I, τ, Z ρ i ψ ), for I , τ , and ψ generated in a CLIENT ACTION 2 query to a client C, and any ρ i generated in the initialization procedure for uncompromised server S i with i ∈ I , D outputs 1 and halts. 5. If A finishes, D outputs 0 and halts.
If (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of DH triples, this simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from P 1 until E occurs, when the simulation halts and D outputs 1. If (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of random triples, then D outputs 1 only if A happens to query H 2 with a third parameter equal to one of the values tested in the simulation. This could happen if one of the ρ i or ψ values generated by the simulator is zero or if none of those values are zero but the Z value is such that one of the n ro queries made by the adversary to H 2 has a third parameter equal to Z ρ i ψ . Recalling that n is the total number of servers, and thus an upper bound on the number of uncompromised servers, the former probability is at most (n + n in + n ex )/q, and the latter is at most n ro n/q.
Let t be the running time of D, and note that
The claim follows from the fact that Adv
Protocol P 3 . Let P 3 be a protocol that is identical to P 2 except for the following, where Simhash and Simprove refer to the simulated hash functions and simulated provers described in Appendix A: 
Proof. Assume Adv
(A)+2ε, and thus, by Fact 2.2, Pr(Succ
Now we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X, Y, Z ), D simulates P 3 for A with the following changes:
, where
Simprove Q fails, D outputs 0 and halts. 3. In a SERVER ACTION 3 query to an uncompromised server S i using parameters (B, V ),
,
, and
Simprove R fails, D outputs 0 and halts. 4. In a SERVER ACTION 4 query to an uncompromised server S i ,
where When (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 2 , with difference at most
When (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of random triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 3 , the statistical difference coming from the 1/q probability that (X, Y, Z ) is actually a DH triple. Let t be the running time for D, and note that
Simulation Soundness. We define Fraud as the event that the adversary is able to produce a new valid SS-NIZKP (of one of the four types used in the protocol) for a statement that does not satisfy the particular relation corresponding to that type of SS-NIZKP. Formally, let E 1 be the event that A sends a valid Q-SS-NIZKP σ in a SERVERACTION3 query for a string (τ, E C , B, V ) not previously used in a CLIENTACTION2 query to client C, where (τ, E C , B, V ) does not satisfy Q . Let E 2 be the event that A sends a valid R-SS-NIZKP σ i for a server S i in a SERVERACTION4 query to any server S j for a string
does not satisfy R . Let E 3 be the event that A sends a valid S-SS-NIZKP i for a server S i in a SERVERACTION5 query to any server S j for a string (i, τ , C i , R i ) that was not previously used in a SERVERACTION4 query to server S i , where (i, τ , C i , R i ) does not satisfy S . Let E 4 be the event that A sends a valid T -SS-NIZKP i for a server S i in a SERVERACTION6 query to any server S j for a string (i, τ , g, C i , C i , R i ) that was not previously used in a SERVERACTION5 query to server S i , where
Claim 5.5. For any adversary A running against P 3 ,
Proof. We split the proof into four parts. Part 1. Let ε be the probability that E 1 occurs when A is running against protocol P 3 . We construct an algorithm D that simulates P 3 with the following change: D guesses which SERVERACTION3 query will cause E 1 to occur, and on that query D outputs the pair ((τ, E C , B, V ), σ ) associated with that query and halts. The simulation is indistinguishable from P 3 until D halts. D outputs a valid Q-SS-NIZKP σ for a string (τ, E C , B, V ) that does not satisfy Q with probability ε/n in . This implies SERR Q (n ro , n in + n ex ) ≥ ε/n in , where SERR Q (n ro , n pr ) is the soundness error of the Q-SS-NIZKP protocol from Appendix A given n ro random oracle queries and n pr proof queries. For this protocol SERR Q (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q, so Pr(E 1 ) ≤ n in (n ro + 1)/q. In the following proofs we do not use Claim 5.5 directly, but instead use the fact that the bound on Pr(Fraud) in Claim 5.5 applies to any of the protocols and simulations that we create from this point forward. This is easy to see, since the simulator does not actually do anything but run the protocol and stop at some point to guess a fraudulent proof.
Protocol P 4 . Let P 4 be a protocol that is identical to P 3 except for the following:
1. In initialization, ρ R ← Z q , is generated, and for y generated in initialization, H 0 (y) returns g ρ . (Recall that h = H 0 (y).) 2. In a CLIENT ACTION 2 query to a client C, B ← (y β , g β ). 3. In a SERVERACTION4 query to an uncompromised server S i that uses a B value (received in its associated SERVERACTION3 query) produced in a CLIENT ACTION 2 query,
Note that this computation does not rely on the secret shares of uncompromised servers.
Claim 5.6. For any adversary A,
Proof. We show that if Fraud does not occur, P 4 is perfectly indistinguishable from P 3 . For this we simply need to show that in a SERVERACTION4 query to an uncompromised server S i that uses a B value produced in a CLIENT ACTION 2 query, the C i value computed in P 4 and P 3 will be the same, as long as Fraud does not occur. To see this, note that in this case, y = g x implies y = g x , and thus
. Now let ε be the probability that Fraud occurs in P 3 . Then Pr(Succ
(A)) + ε, and thus, by Fact 2.2, Adv
(A) + 2ε. The claim follows from the fact that ε ≤ 4kn in (n ro + 1)/q. Protocol P 5 . Let P 5 be a protocol that is identical to P 4 except that in a SERVERACTION3 query to a server S i , for a client C, and using parameters (τ, E C , B, V ), where (τ, E C , B, V ) was never used in a CLIENTACTION2 query to client C,
P 5 stops and we say that A succeeds.
Claim 5.7. For any adversary A,
Proof. By having P 5 stop and saying that A succeeds, we could only increase the probability of success of A.
Protocol P 6 . Let E 1 be the event that A sends a valid S-SS-NIZKP i for an uncompromised server S i in a SERVERACTION5 query to any server S j for a string (i, τ , C i , R i ) that was not previously used in a SERVERACTION4 query to server S i . Let E 2 be the event that A sends a valid T -SS-NIZKP i for an uncompromised server S i in a SERVERACTION6 query to any server S j for a string (i, τ , g, C i , C i , R i ) that was not previously used in a SERVERACTION5 query to server S i .
Let E = E 1 ∨ E 2 . Let P 6 be a protocol that is identical to P 5 except that if E occurs, P 6 halts and A fails.
Claim 5.8. For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t = O(t + (n
Proof. Let ε be the probability that E occurs in P 5 . Then Pr(Succ (A) + 2ε. The intuition behind this proof is that if E occurs, then the adversary must somehow have computed h raised to the secret share of the uncompromised server. This essentially implies that the adversary performs a Diffie-Hellman computation on h and the public key y. However, in a reduction argument from DDH, there is a difficulty when trying to simulate the protocol (and in particular the C i values from uncompromised servers), since we do not know the secret shares of the uncompromised servers. Fortunately, the auxiliary values (i.e., V and the V j , V j , and V j values from the other servers) give us enough information to simulate the C i values.
Formally, we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X, Y, Z ), D simulates P 5 for A with these changes:
In the initialization procedure, y ← Y and H 1 (y) ← X . (Recall that h = H 1 (y).)
For each i ∈ J , x i R ← Z q , and for each uncompromised server S i ,
In a SERVERACTION4 query to an uncompromised server S i that does not use a value B produced in a CLIENTACTION2 query to a client, do the following: (a) Let I B ⊆ I be the set of indices where for j ∈ I B , the tuple (B j , V j , V j , V j ) was not produced by server S j , and let I G = I \I B . Use the B, V, { j, B j , V j , V j , V j } j∈I values known to S i to perform the following computation, where
. In a SERVERACTION5 query to an uncompromised server, if there is a tuple (R i , i ) that was not produced by server S i , S i is not compromised, and i is valid, then perform the following computation, where
If Z = Z * , D halts and outputs 1, else D halts and outputs 0. 4. In a SERVERACTION6 query to an uncompromised server, if there is a tuple (C i , R i , i ) that was not produced by server S i , S i is not compromised, and i is valid, then perform the following computation, where 
for some β, π, γ , {r j } j∈I , {r j } j∈I ∈ Z q . For j ∈ I B , we may also assume
Thus as long as Fraud does not occur, the simulation of the SERVER ACTION 4 query is perfectly indistinguishable from the real SERVER ACTION 4 query in either P 5 or P 6 . Also as long as Fraud does not occur, when (X, Y, Z ) is a DH triple, then in both computations of Z * above,
where y i = g x i and y = g x , where x and x i are not necessarily known to D. Thus
is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 5 until E occurs, the statistical difference coming from the probability that Fraud occurs. When E occurs, D outputs 1. When (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of random triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 5 , the statistical difference coming from (1) the probability that Fraud occurs, and (2) the probability that Fraud does not occur but D halts and outputs 1, which is at most kn in /q, since Z is random.
Let t be the running time for D, and note that
Protocol P 7 . Let P 7 be a protocol that is identical to P 6 except for the following: 
The intuition behind this is that with a random y * , A will fail with high probability, as it should.)
Claim 5.9. For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t = O(t + (n
(A) + 2ε, and thus by Fact 2.2, Pr(Succ
For the intuition behind this proof, consider if P 7 was simply P 6 with E C computed randomly. (Indeed this would remove the last password dependency from the protocol, which was our original goal.) Then we would try to show that if the adversary can distinguish the two protocols (P 6 and P 7 ), then the adversary can break the (semantic security of) encryption E C , and hence DDH. This could be proven using a straightforward reduction from DDH except for the fact that we need to simulate C i values from uncompromised servers who receive B values generated by the adversary. The method in the previous proof cannot be used directly, since it depends explicitly on E C being valid. To solve this problem, in P 7 we also randomize the B i values from uncompromised servers, and we compute C i values as in the method in the previous proof, but using a randomly chosen y * value. Our reduction from DDH will then be set up so that the B i values from uncompromised servers are affected in the same way as E C , i.e., they are computed honestly for valid DH triples, but are random for random triples. Similarly, the y * values are computed honestly (i.e., y * = g x as in the previous proof) for valid DH triples, but are random for random triples (and, in particular, are not dependent on the correct form of E C ). Putting this all together, we show that we can perform the simulation in the reduction from DDH, and thus we show that if the adversary can distinguish the two protocols, then DDH can be broken.
Formally, we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X, Y, Z ), D simulates P 7 for A with these changes: is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 6 , the statistical difference coming from the probability that Fraud occurs. When (X, Y, Z ) is drawn from the set of random triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P 7 , the statistical difference coming from the 1/q probability that (X, Y, Z ) is actually a DH triple, and the probability that Fraud occurs.
In the initialization of a client
To see this, consider a non-DH triple (X, Y, Z ), and assume Fraud does not occur. Then obviously the distribution of E C is the same . Consider a (τ, B, V ) tuple sent by A to a set of servers I . The distribution of the B i value produced by an uncompromised server S i will be the same as in P 7 , i.e., in both B i will be random in G q × G q .
We are left to show that the distribution of y * values produced in P 7 and the simulation are the same. In particular, we need to show that the y * value produced in the simulation for a given τ is the same for each uncompromised server using τ , is randomly distributed, and, if a corresponding C i value is revealed, is independent from any y * value produced in the simulation for any other τ at any uncompromised server. 8 We argue this as follows. In the simulation, in any SERVERACTION4 query to an uncompromised server using a given τ , the y * value will be fixed. This is because (1) τ determines τ , and no τ is ever duplicated (see P 1 ), implying that each r j value for j ∈ I G can be determined by examining the SERVERACTION3 query to the instance of S j corresponding to τ , (2) τ determines V , and (3) τ determines each B j and V j , and for j ∈ I B , since Fraud does not occur (specifically, for an R-SS-NIZKP not produced in a SERVERACTION3 query to server S j ), this fixes
To see that y * is random (and in particular, independent of y), simply notice that the y * value includes a random factor. Specifically, for an uncompromised server S i , it includes the factor g r i (s ρ (V ))
where s ρ (V ) = g π C (see P 5 ) which implies this factor is of the form (g ) r i , where g ∈ G q and g = 1. However, one can see that for a given B i , all values of r i are equally likely (since log X Z = log g y), so (g ) r i is random. Note that the above argument implies that the y * value computed by S i using τ is independent from any other y * produced by S i , since the random factor r i would be independent. Now we claim that if any C i is revealed for a given τ (say τ 1 ) the y * value computed by S i will be independent of any y * computed at any other uncompromised server S j for a different τ (say τ 2 ). This is basically because the adversary could not produce a valid S-SS-NIZKP j for an uncompromised server S j , and a valid j for τ 1 from every other server is required for S i to reveal its C i value. So if C i is revealed, then all uncompromised servers in I must have run SERVERACTION4 using τ 1 . The claim follows by noting that a y * value computed at an uncompromised server S j for τ 2 = τ 1 would be independent from the y * value computed at S j using τ 1 , by the original argument about the independence of y * values computed at the same server. Let t be the running time for D, and note that 8 Note that y * is only used in computing C i , and if C i is not revealed, then the distribution of y * is irrelevant to the behavior of the adversary.
Now we show that in P 7 , unless Fraud occurs, an uncompromised server will accept exactly those tuples (τ, B, V ) generated by a client (except with probability n in /q), and thus P 7 gives no information about π C except for testing for it (as defined in P 5 ) in a SERVERACTION3 query that does not come from a client.
Assume Fraud does not occur. Then say (τ, B, V ) is generated by a client. An uncompromised server S i accepts by testing that i∈I C i = y. However, since Fraud does not occur, every C i produced by A (with a valid i ) satisfies C i = g λ i,I x i , and, by P 6 , it comes from a compromised server. Furthermore, by P 4 , every C i produced by an uncompromised server satisfies
As in the proof of Claim 5.6,
..,n} is the (k, n)-threshold sharing of the discrete log of y over base g, with the fixed values {x j } j∈J , where J is the set of k − 1 compromised servers. Note that we do not necessarily know x i for i ∈ J . Now let I B = I ∩ J and I G = I \I B . Then
Thus the tuple (τ, B, V ) would be accepted. Again assume Fraud does not occur. Then say (τ, B, V ) is generated by A. Again an uncompromised server S i accepts by testing that i∈I C i = y. Also every C i produced by A (with a valid i ) satisfies C i = g λ i,I x i and comes from a compromised server. However, now every C i produced by an uncompromised server satisfies
, for a random y * (associated with the τ value used by these servers), independent of y. Let {x i } i∈{1,...,n} be a (k, n)-threshold sharing of the discrete log of y * over base g, such that x i = x i for i ∈ J , where J is the set of k − 1 compromised servers. Note that we do not necessarily know x i for i ∈ J . Now let I B = I ∩ J and I G = I \I B . Then
Thus the tuple (τ, B, V ) would be rejected unless y * = y, which occurs with probability 1/q.
Let E be the event that Fraud occurs, A succeeds in a password guess (as defined in P 5 ), or y * = y for some random y * as above.
Pr Succ
The theorem follows from this fact, along with Claims 5-9.
Appendix A. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Our protocols employ a variety of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [7] . Here we define their security under the random oracle assumption. Our definition for NIZK proofs is based on [14] , which in turn is based on [36] . In particular, we show that our NIZK proofs satisfy simulation-soundness, which turns out to be necessary for the security of our main protocol. Our proof constructions in Sections A.1-A.4 are based on standard techniques from [13] and [21] . For a relation R, let L R = {w : (w, v) ∈ R} be the language defined by the relation. For any NP language L, note that there is a natural witness relation R containing pairs (w, v) where v is the witness for the membership of w in L, and that L R = L. Recall that κ is a security parameter. Recall is the set of all hash functions. In this section we assume all H ∈ have a range of {0, 1} κ .
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• Zero-knowledge proofs: A simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (SS-NIZKP system) for an NP language L, with witness relation R, is a tuple (P, V, Sim), where P is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, V is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm, and Sim is a probabilistic polynomialtime protocol for answering both hash queries and prove queries, 10 denoted by Simhash and Simprove, respectively, satisfying:
2. Simulation-soundness: There is a negligible function SERR(κ, n ro , n pr ) (soundness error) such that for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A that make at most n ro hash queries and n pr prove queries, Pr[Expt 
, where the maximum is over all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A that make at most n ro hash queries and n pr prove queries, and where experiments Expt A (κ) and Expt A (κ) are defined as follows:
where 
Remark A.2. The adversary A used in experiment Expt
Sim A (κ) defined for simulationsoundness may query Simprove with strings w ∈ L. For these strings, Simprove will 10 Prove queries take a string w as input and produce a proof that there is a v such that (w, v) ∈ R. In general, one cannot guarantee that such a query could be answered. However, if the hash function is also being simulated, then it will be possible to answer these queries, at least in our constructions. While this is not the most general way to define SS-NIZKP, it is sufficient for our purposes. 11 We assume a proof includes the input w, or at least that any proof is only valid for a single w, i.e., it is uniquely applicable [36] . return a proof σ such that V Simhash (w, σ ) returns TRUE. However, by the definition of simulation-soundness, these proofs will not help A produce any new valid proofs for any w ∈ L.
A.1. Q Details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP Q = (Prove Q , Verify Q , Sim Q ) over the language defined by the predicate Q , and we prove its security. 12 As discussed above, when this SS-NIZKP is used in protocol P, we let H be H 3 .
Recall that
Prove Q , Verify Q , and Sim Q are implemented in Figs. 4-6, respectively. Note that Sim Q uses the standard technique of "backpatching" random oracle queries. In the following we include the subscript Q on the SERR and SIMERR functions, and remove κ from the parameters, since this is already implicit-Q is defined over the group G q where |q| = κ.
is an SS-NIZKP with SERR Q (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q, and SIMERR Q (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 3 .
Proof. (Completeness) Straightforward.
(Simulation-soundness) Consider an adversary A that makes n ro hash queries and n pr Prove Q queries.
Say A makes a query (τ, E C , B, V, B , V ) to the random oracle, where (τ, E C , B, V ) does not satisfy Q and (τ, E C , B, V, B , V ) was not backpatched in a Simprove Q query. Say B = (y
and y = g c 4 . Then to have a proof σ = (e, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) using this random oracle query such that
However, if (τ, E C , B, V ) does not satisfy Q , then β 1 = β 2 , implying e = (µ 1 − µ 2 )/ (β 2 − β 1 ) mod q, and thus there is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a Simprove Q query that results in a backpatching on (τ, E C , B, V, B , V ), then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most (n ro + 1)/q, with the extra 1/q probability from A guessing the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SERR Q (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q.
(Zero-knowledge) The distributions of Simprove Q (τ, E C , B, V ) and Prove Q ((τ, E C , B, V ), (β, π, γ ) ) are exactly the same for any ((τ, E C , B, V ), (β, π, γ ) ) in the relation defined by Q , except for the cases when Simprove Q aborts. The probability that Simprove Q aborts is at most the probability of a collision between the new (B , V ) pair and any pair that appeared in a previous random oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any V ∈ G q × G q is equally likely, and that given a fixed V , and a fixed e, z 2 , z 3 , there are q values of B ∈ G q × G q that are equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous pair is at most (n ro + n pr )/q 3 . Since Simprove Q is queried n pr times, SIMERR Q (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 3 .
A.2. R Details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP R = (Prove R , Verify R , Sim R ) over the language defined by the predicate R , and we prove its security. When this SS-NIZKP is used in protocol P, we let H be H 4 .
Prove R , Verify R , and Sim R are implemented in Figs. 7-9, respectively. Note that Sim R uses the standard technique of "backpatching" random oracle queries.
In the following we include the subscript R on the SERR and SIMERR functions, and remove κ from the parameters, since this is already implicit-R is defined over the group G q where |q| = κ. Lemma A.4. R = (Prove R , Verify R , Sim R ) is an SS-NIZKP with SERR R (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q, and SIMERR R (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 5 .
(Simulation-soundness) Consider an adversary A that makes n ro hash queries and n pr Prove R queries.
Say A makes a query
the protocol aborts if backpatching causes the hash function to be inconsistent with a previous hash query. Simhash R behaves like a normal random oracle, except that it maintains consistency with the backpatching. 13 Thus there is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a Simprove R query that results in backpatching the random oracle on the input
, then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most (n ro + 1)/q, with the extra 1/q probability from A guessing the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SERR R (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q. Fig. 10. Prove S ((i, τ , C i , R i ), (a, γ ) ).
(Zero-knowledge) The distributions of
in the relation defined by R , except for the cases when Simprove R aborts. The probability that Simprove R aborts is at most the probability of a collision between the new (B, V,B i ,Ṽ i ,Ṽ i ,Ṽ i ) tuple and any tuple that appeared in a previous random oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that there are q 5 possible tuple values that are equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous pair is at most (n ro + n pr )/q 5 . Since Simprove R is queried n pr times, SIMERR R (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 5 .
A.3. S Details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP S = (Prove S , Verify S , Sim S ) over the language defined by the predicate S , and we prove its security. As discussed above, when this SS-NIZKP is used in protocol P, we let H be H 5 .
Prove S , Verify S , and Sim S are implemented in Figs. 10-12, respectively. Note that Sim S uses the standard technique of "backpatching" random oracle queries. In the following we include the subscript S on the SERR and SIMERR functions, and remove κ from the parameters, since this is already implicit-S is defined over the group G q where |q| = κ. (Simulation-soundness) Consider an adversary A that makes n ro hash queries and n pr Prove S queries.
Say A makes a query (i, τ , C i , R i , W, R ) to the random oracle, where
for some a, a , γ, µ, µ , ν ∈ Z q . Let c, c ∈ Z q be such that h = g c and h = g c . Then to have a proof σ = (e, z 1 , z 2 ) using this random oracle query such that However, if (i, τ , C i , R i ) does not satisfy S , then a = a , implying e = (µ − µ )/ (a − a) mod q, and thus there is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a Simprove S query that results in a backpatching on (i, τ , C i , R i , W, R ), then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most (n ro + 1)/q, with the extra 1/q probability from A guessing the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SERR S (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q.
(Zero-knowledge) The distributions of Simprove S (i, τ , C i , R i ) and Prove S ((i, τ , C i , R i ), (a, γ ) ) are exactly the same for any ((i, τ , C i , R i ), (a, γ ) ) in the relation defined by S , except for the cases when Simprove S aborts. The probability that Simprove S aborts is at most the probability of a collision between the new W and R values and any value that appeared in a previous random oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any W ∈ G q and any R [2] ∈ G q is equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous value is at most (n ro + n pr )/q 2 . Since Simprove S is queried n pr times, SIMERR S (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 2 . 14 Thus there is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a Simprove T query that results in a backpatching on (i, τ , g, C i , C i , R i , W , W, R ), then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most (n ro + 1)/q, with the extra 1/q probability from A guessing the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SERR T (n ro , n pr ) ≤ (n ro + 1)/q.
Simprove T (i, τ , g, C i , C i , R i ) and
are exactly the same for any ((i, τ , g, C i , C i , R i ), (a, γ )) in the relation defined by T , except for the cases when Simprove T aborts. The probability that Simprove T aborts is at most the probability of a collision between the new W and R values and any value that appeared in a previous random oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any W ∈ G q and any R [2] ∈ G q is equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous value is at most (n ro + n pr )/q 2 . Since Simprove T is queried n pr times, SIMERR T (n ro , n pr ) ≤ n pr (n ro + n pr )/q 2 . Figures 16-18 give the formal specification of the protocol, where index(U ) returns the index of U ∈ Servers, and {M i } i∈I denotes M i 1 , . . . , M i where I = {i 1 , . . . , i } and i 1 < · · · < i . The Initialization protocol (Fig. 16 ) is run before any queries by the adversary. Note that in Fig. 17 , C ← U simply denotes a renaming of U . 
Appendix B. Formal Specification of the Protocol
V i ← (h γ i g r i , g γ i ) V i ← (h γ i (V [1]) r i , g γ i ) V i ← (h γ i (V [2]) r i , g γ i ) σ i ← Prove R ((i,
